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RETHINKING THE FOUNDATIONAL CRITIQUES
OF LAWYERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Scott L. Cummings*
INTRODUCTION
The question of whether lawyers help or hurt social movements has been
hotly debated by legal scholars for nearly half a century. As progressive
social movements began to decline in the 1970s, scholars developed a
powerful critical account of the role that lawyers had played, stressing how
lawyer domination and overinvestment in legal tactics had worked against
sustainable grassroots activism. Despite significant changes in politics and
the profession since the civil rights period, these foundational critiques of
progressive lawyering have persisted, fostering profound skepticism about
what lawyers can do “for and to” social movements.1
This Article argues that the current moment invites reconsideration of
these critiques. The rise of new social movements—from marriage equality
to Black Lives Matter to the recent mobilization against President Trump’s
immigration order—and the response of a new generation of movement
lawyers eager to lend support has refocused attention on the appropriate
role that lawyers should play in advancing progressive social change.
Rather than fall back on familiar critical themes, the time is ripe for
developing a new affirmative vision.
This Article seeks to reappraise the foundational critiques of progressive
lawyers from the perspective of comparative institutional analysis. This
analysis locates lawyers within a broader field of social activism in which
nonlegal actors confront their own set of challenges in advancing
movement goals: such as struggles over leadership, debates over the
desirability of gradual versus radical change, and the constant threat of
reversal and backlash. Legal scholars, focusing on what they know best
(lawyers and courts), have not investigated the challenges to social
movement activism within this broader field, which is the subject of a
* Robert Henigson Professor of Legal Ethics and Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
This Article is part of a colloquium entitled Civil Litigation Ethics at a Time of Vanishing
Trials held at Fordham University School of Law. For an overview of the colloquium, see
Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial: Unrepresented Claimants, De
Facto Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV.
1899 (2017).
1. See Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers Do For, and To, Social
Movements: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 1 (Austin Sarat
& Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006).
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significant scholarly literature in social science. Drawing on insights from
social science research, this Article asks how evaluation of lawyers in social
movements might change if the same analytical tools that have been used to
spotlight the limits of lawyers and legal advocacy were also applied to
nonlegal actors and strategies. What would we learn by comparing the
challenges social movements face outside of law to those faced by lawyers
mobilizing inside the legal system? This Article’s central claim is that
expanding the frame of critical analysis to highlight the parallel challenges
that nonlawyers face in advancing social change outside of court weakens
the power of critical accounts specific to lawyers. In short, reframing the
way we think of social movements can rehabilitate the way we think about
lawyers’ contributions to them.
I. LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:
TOWARD A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
More than a half century ago, the NAACP’s seminal victory in Brown v.
Board of Education2 ignited intense debate—in the academy and in the
streets—over the appropriate role of lawyers in the struggle for social
change.3 With America on the cusp of political upheaval that would
transform understandings of the relation between law, social movements,
and state power, the question of whether lawyers promoted or impeded
reform went to the core of the democratic projects championed by civil
rights and other progressive movements of the time. The answers
formulated in the wake of Brown, as these projects began to decline, have
framed subsequent discussions of lawyering for social change around two
foundational critiques. The first is one of lawyer accountability, claiming
that lawyers advancing rights on behalf of marginalized constituencies risk
letting their own ideological commitments undercut the interests of those
they serve.4 The second is one of legal efficacy, claiming that courtcentered legal strategies are ineffective at best, unable to change social
practice on the ground, and detrimental at worst, causing social movement
demobilization and backlash while legitimizing the status quo.5 Taken
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. For a classic account, see Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959).
4. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471–72 (1976); William H.
Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal
Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 163–64 (2004).
5. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 338–39 (1991) (concluding that courts almost never effect social change);
STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL
CHANGE 91, 214 (2d ed. Univ. of Mich. Press 2007) (1974) (arguing that lawyers pursuing
rights generated “support for the political system by legitimating the existing order” and
promoting “one-on-one conflicts within the framework of the adversary system”); Alan
David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1051–52 (1978)
(arguing that U.S. Supreme Court decisions legitimize the status quo rather than promote
change); Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis,
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together, these critiques have anchored a descriptive account of civil rights
history that associates overinvestment in law reform—the classical strategy
of “legal liberalism”6—with the decline of the very progressive movements
that Brown helped to spark.7 And they have supported a normative account
of social change lawyering in which lawyers play a circumscribed role,
deemphasizing courts and deferring to clients in the quest to build power
from the bottom up.8
The recent explosion of scholarly interest among legal academics in
social movements has occurred against the backdrop of these foundational
critiques. On one side is a conversation about lawyers and lawyering,
which has played out in the academic fields of the legal profession and
clinical law, drawing upon insights from legal mobilization theory.9 Here,
recent research has focused on demonstrating how contemporary lawyers,
unlike their legal liberal predecessors, do not rush to court seeking national
policy change for underrepresented groups. To the contrary, lawyers in the
contemporary literature follow the lead of social movement organizations
and coordinate law with politics in efforts to achieve campaign objectives.10
Empirically, this literature stresses that lawyers are not blinkered by the
“myth of rights” in ways that undermine movement activism.11
Prescriptively, the literature suggests that lawyers should represent
movements in client-centered terms, using law to ensure that “the
movement takes the lead.”12
This conversation has been largely disconnected from scholarship within
constitutional law but has important resonances with it. Like the lawyering
literature, its main focus is on the role of social movements as crucial
democratic actors. Decentering the U.S. Supreme Court, scholars have
drawn attention to the role of social movements producing constitutional
law from the bottom up by opening space for new constitutional orders to
emerge and channeling movement claims into pressure for judicial

81 J. AM. HIST. 81, 82–83 (1994) (arguing that Brown caused backlash that set the civil
rights movement back in the short term).
6. LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 2 (1996); see also
Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown,
115 YALE L.J. 256, 263–64 (2005).
7. GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND
KILLS POLITICS 123–24, 127 (2009) (discussing the backlash against Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973)).
8. See Anthony Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of
Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2146 (1991).
9. See generally MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND
THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994).
10. Jennifer Gordon, The Lawyer Is Not the Protagonist: Community Campaigns, Law,
and Social Change, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2133, 2144 (2007).
11. See, e.g., Sameer Ashar, Public Interest Law and Resistance Movements, 95 CALIF.
L. REV. 1879, 1919–20 (2007).
12. Kathleen M. Erskine & Judy Marblestone, The Movement Takes the Lead: The Role
of Lawyers in the Struggle for a Living Wage in Santa Monica, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 249, 257–58.

1990

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

recognition.13 This happens by movements asserting new norms through
direct action, changing public opinion, and using their power to reshape
political processes to support new judicial appointments.14 Scholars in this
literature make the empirical claim that once social movements have shifted
culture and transformed politics, Supreme Court decisions change to
validate the new consensus social movements have produced.15 The
normative implication is that the Court should lag behind culture, which
intersects with the lawyering literature in that both place social movements
out ahead of legal change. To the extent that courts do not heed this
warning, they risk a backlash that undermines the causes they purport to
advance.16
Both of these literatures present powerful and deeply optimistic accounts
of the transformative potential of grassroots mobilization, appropriately
supported by law and legal institutions. Yet, in so doing, they reproduce a
version of the foundational critiques within the new social movement
scholarship: promoting lawyer deference to social movement clients to
enhance accountability and promoting judicial deference to social
movement political activism to enhance efficacy. In the professional
literature, lawyers are skilled technicians—“hired guns”—for movements.17
In the constitutional literature, they are deemphasized as agents of reform.
Because legal change occurs through bottom-up norm generation, culture
shifting, and judicial appointment making, the role of lawyers is limited to
the formalistic one of filing the case (so a court may validate the principles
that movements have already enacted). The takeaway from both literatures
is that lawyers should stand behind movements, supporting them when
necessary, but not get too far out front.
Implicit in this portrait of lawyers is a crucial counterfactual: that putting
movements first will in fact yield more accountable and effective challenges
to power. All too often, this counterfactual is presumed rather than proven.
It is nearly always the case that in analyzing a campaign for systemic
reform, one can find errors in judgment, flaws in execution, or
disappointing results. However, in judging the impact of lawyer strategic
decisions on a given campaign, the relevant question is whether lawyers
and legal advocacy do a better or worse job than the available alternatives.
Answering that question with precision is impossible because one can never
know how events would have unfolded if lawyers had not been involved.
Even if it is possible to dissect and critique legal strategy and outcomes
with twenty-twenty hindsight, it is never possible to know if the problems

13. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social
Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001).
14. See Jack Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the
Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK L. REV. 27, 28–30 (2005).
15. See id. at 30; see also Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101
MICH. L. REV. 2595 (2003) (discussing the empirical connection between public opinion and
judicial outcomes).
16. See generally Klarman, supra note 5.
17. See, e.g., Erskine & Marblestone, supra note 12, at 258–59.
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identified were a product of the unique limitations of law and legal
strategists.
This is where comparative institutional analysis may helpfully reframe
the discussion. While the new social movement literature reprises familiar
critical themes, it also provides an opportunity to revisit and potentially
move beyond the critical account of progressive lawyers.18 It does so by
paving the way for incorporation of parallel social science discussions of
accountability and efficacy that permit comparison of lawyers and legal
action to their social movement counterparts.
This comparative
institutional perspective addresses the limits of existing theoretical
accounts, which have overstated the role of lawyers and court-centered
advocacy and understated the role of nonlawyer leaders and nonlegal
strategies—and the challenges the latter face in social movements. By
explicitly theorizing the opportunities for and constraints on alternatives to
law, a comparative institutional perspective reveals how the foundational
critiques of lawyers may be better understood as specific versions of more
general criticisms of social change actors and strategies.
II. REFRAMING THE FOUNDATIONAL CRITIQUES
This part suggests how a comparative institutional perspective helps to
reframe the foundational critiques in ways that soften their negative edge,
revealing lawyers as less suspect allies in challenges to power. In each
case, reframing works by incorporating insights across the existing lawsocial science disciplinary divide.
Incorporating a more complex
understanding of social movements as comprised of independent
organizational actors with their own representational contests reframes the
accountability critique as a problem of leaders, not just lawyers. This
changes the analytical approach by comparing the risks of alternative
representational structures (inside and outside of the lawyer-client
relationship) and the benefits of coordination between lawyers and
nonlawyers in potentially reducing conflicts. The project therefore becomes
identifying and evaluating the conditions under which movement leadership
is most likely to be accountable.
Similarly, incorporating a more nuanced view of how lawyers become
involved in movements and the viability of alternative courses of political
action reframes the efficacy debate as a problem of politics, not just law.
This changes the analytical approach to court impact and backlash by
comparing the tradeoffs of available political alternatives while also
considering the benefits of coordinated legal and political strategies. The
project then becomes identifying and evaluating the conditions under which
outsider challenges (legal and political) are most likely to succeed in
changing rules, promoting implementation, avoiding backlash, and shifting
power.

18. See Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness
and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 940–41 (2007).
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At bottom, using a comparative institutional perspective facilitates the
same basic analytical move: comparing lawyers and legal action to their
social movement counterparts. Doing so helps to deepen the evaluation of
the role of lawyers in social movements by focusing on their relative
accountability and relative efficacy.
This comparative institutional
framework repositions criticisms of lawyers and lawyering as specific
versions of more general criticisms of social change actors and strategies.
Understanding this specificity permits a finer-grained judgment of
accountability and efficacy because the relative comparison group changes:
if all social change actors and actions confront some version of the same
problems, then the question becomes whether lawyers and legal strategies
do a better or worse job than viable alternatives—and under what
conditions.
A. Relative Accountability:
What Is Special About Lawyers?
This section explores the concept of relative accountability by engaging
with two critical interventions about the lawyer’s role in social movements:
Derrick Bell’s famous indictment of civil rights lawyers for “serving two
masters” in the pursuit of school integration,19 and Lani Guinier and Gerald
Torres’s more recent work on “demosprudence” as a movement-oriented
model of progressive lawyering that also contains a critical perspective on
its legal liberal counterpart.20 In both cases, the basic method is to reframe
each discussion in a comparative institutional framework by reference to
insights from social science about parallel accountability problems in social
movement activism. The goal is to shift the terms of each discussion away
from lawyers per se to more generalized problems of social movement
mobilization: in Bell’s account, focusing on the problem of organizational
professionalization (rather than professionalism) and in Guinier and
Torres’s account, focusing on the problem of elite representation (rather
than legal representation).
1. Professionalization
The critical view of lawyers as a threat to collective action rests on
concerns about the nature of the professional relationship in social
movement contexts where mechanisms for promoting lawyer accountability
to clients and broader constituencies are said to be weak.21 Derrick Bell’s
famous critique of NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF)
lawyers resonated so powerfully within the legal academy precisely because
it sounded in terms of professionalism and legal ethics. By arguing that
LDF lawyers were either disregarding or minimizing the voices of African
American parents who wanted quality schools, not just integration, Bell
19. See generally Bell, Jr., supra note 4.
20. See generally Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a
Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740 (2014).
21. See Simon, supra note 4, at 162.
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located the dispute squarely within the core principles of zealous
advocacy.22 The metaphor “serving two masters” underscored the idea that
client interests were being sacrificed: both to funder priorities and to the
LDF attorneys’ own assessment of the appropriate educational goal.23
Bell’s argument hinged on a sympathetic reading of Justice John Marshall
Harlan II’s dissent in NAACP v. Button,24 in which he stressed that LDF
lawyer’s “divided allegiance” could “prevent full compliance with his basic
professional obligations.”25 Bell went further, suggesting that LDF lawyers
were violating the spirit of the professional code, if not its letter, by
allowing “the influence of attorney and organization” to create conflicts
with the interests of class members who were diffuse, uninformed, and
divided.26
Bell’s critique framed the lawyer’s role in social movements by isolating
the problem of conflicting loyalties in the class action context and situating
that problem within a familiar professional discussion. Although Bell’s
critique trenchantly spotlighted the fundamental problem of accountability
in cause lawyering, it distorted the issue by treating it in isolation from the
broader social movement context and suggesting that the problem and
solution could be understood through analysis of the ethical rules.27
However, the mere fact of a potential formal ethical violation begged the
most important professional and political questions. Formal rules of
professional responsibility, as the conduct of southern states in response to
NAACP enforcement activity underscored, could be manipulated by
opponents to undermine legitimate legal activity.28 More significantly,
litigation that raised formal conflict questions could still be socially
valuable if more people within the affected constituency benefitted overall
relative to alternatives in which subgroups pursued conflicting goals or did
nothing.29
From a comparative institutional perspective, the deeper question raised
by Bell’s analysis is which type of agency relationship between movement
leaders and their constituency is most likely to produce accountability in a
particular context. Bell’s fundamental claim—that idealistic leaders funded
by well-resourced actors outside of the main constituency may act in ways
that diverge from the interests of a significant portion of the constituency
they purport to represent—is generalizable. The questions are then twofold.
First, in a particular social movement context, is there something about
lawyers and their legal organizations that poses unique representational
risks? And, second, is there something about nonlegal social movement
organizations that makes them better suited to the representational task?
22. See Bell, Jr., supra note 4, at 504.
23. Id. at 489–93.
24. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
25. Bell, Jr., supra note 4, at 499.
26. Id. at 504.
27. See id. at 512.
28. Button, 371 U.S. at 419–26.
29. See William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469,
481 (1984).
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Critics of lawyers and legal organizations in social movements make two
types of arguments. First, they suggest that there may be something
inherent in the nature of the lawyer-client relationship that makes it
incompatible with strong lawyer accountability to constituency ends. In
this account, lawyers either represent individual clients, whose ability to
monitor lawyer activity is inherently restricted (and particularly so when the
clients are vulnerable), or the lawyers represent groups through devices like
the class action, which are unaccountable because named plaintiffs often
have “no significant individual stake, and as a result, no incentive to
monitor.”30 Professional rules emphasizing lawyer independence and
confidentiality are said to increase the risks to accountability by inhibiting
monitoring by organizations outside the lawyer-client relationship that may
have greater power and sophistication and thus would be better positioned
to ensure that lawyers serve constituency interests.31 The second critical
argument is that by virtue of their legal expertise, lawyers are in a position
to turn to the legal system to advance their own version of a constituency’s
best interests (Luban’s “problem of democracy”), sometimes against the
views of other movement leaders.32 In Bell’s famous words, “Idealism,
though perhaps rarer than greed, is harder to control.”33
But is such idealism any easier to hold accountable when it is enacted by
nonlawyers?
Movements, as aggregations of loosely connected
organizational and individual actors, always speak through leaders, who
often voice conflicting views.34 Monitoring problems and agency costs are
also classic problems within social movement organizations (SMOs),
though they may operate in different ways. The “iron law of oligarchy,”35
that SMOs tend to be dominated by elites over time and preoccupied with
concerns of organizational maintenance,36 suggests that SMOs may
confront similar pressures that put stress on constituent accountability.
From a formal ethics perspective, it is true that third parties are not
permitted to control lawyers or have access to specific types of client
information.37 However, there are often other monitoring mechanisms
available, particularly in dense organizational fields where political
relationships create pressures on lawyers to conform to goals expressed
through other types of leadership structures. Moreover, in some contexts,

30. Simon, supra note 4, at 163.
31. Id.
32. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 341–43 (1988).
33. Bell, Jr., supra note 4, at 504.
34. See DAVID S. MEYER, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AMERICA
71–74 (2007) (discussing the organizational complexity of social movements and the
potential for conflict and cooperation).
35. See generally ROBERT MICHELS, THE IRON LAW OF OLIGARCHY (1911).
36. See FRANCIS FOX PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: HOW
THEY SUCCEED, WHY THEY FAIL, at xxii (1977).
37. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (stating the
basic confidentiality duty); id. r. 1.7(a)(2) (stating that a conflict exists when there is a
“significant risk” that legal representation of a client will be “materially limited by the
lawyer’s responsibilities to . . . a third person”).

2017]

LAWYERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

1995

lawyers may perform essential tasks articulating a unifying movement
platform and overcoming internal community divisions.
Mark Tushnet’s account of LDF’s drive to Brown makes this point
explicitly. In reflecting on the inherently political solution to the problem
of conflicting interests in movement representation, Tushnet notes: “Both
Houston and Marshall had enormous ability at the essential, and
fundamentally political, task of coordinating the conflicting interests of the
various constituencies that the NAACP’s litigation had to satisfy.”38 As
Tushnet’s analysis suggests, from a comparative institutional perspective,
accountability must be judged based on a contextual view of the broader
movement field, which includes both non-movement lawyers asserting
dissenting legal claims as well as other political actors to whom movement
lawyers must ultimately answer. Lawyers can, given the porousness of the
legal system, go off on their own in ways that are inconsistent with
movement aims. But it is also possible for nonlawyer activists to garner
attention and financial support for positions at odds with broader movement
views.39
With respect to funding conflicts, which Bell stresses in his analysis of
LDF, a key insight of resource mobilization theory in sociology is that
SMOs that rely on external funders who are not direct movement
beneficiaries are “likely to have high levels of tension and conflict.”40
While mobilizing external resources is necessary to overcome the free rider
problem and build organization, it also embeds the problem of external
control as part of the SMO’s basic architecture.41 As social movement
scholars have shown, when SMOs become more professionalized and
dependent on sustained patronage from philanthropic groups, the problem
of leader ideological and funder conflicts deepens—just as they do in legal
groups.42 Accountability, from this comparative perspective, is related to
organizational professionalization, not legal professionalism as such.43
Viewing this issue through a comparative institutional lens does not
negate the critique of lawyer accountability but contextualizes it in helpful
ways by taking the concept of “representation” outside of the narrow
confines of professionalism. This perspective decouples the issue of
representation from the professional framework, where it has been too
cabined by traditional associations with legal ethics, which have
38. MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925–1950, at 157 (1987).
39. See generally BRYAN BURROUGH, DAYS OF RAGE:
AMERICA’S RADICAL
UNDERGROUND, THE FBI, AND THE FORGOTTEN AGE OF REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE (2015)
(documenting the rise of radical leftist groups in the 1970s, including the Weather
Underground, Black Liberation Army, and Symbionese Liberation Army).
40. John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social Movements:
A Partial Theory, 82 AM. J. SOC. 1212, 1216–31 (1977).
41. See DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK
INSURGENCY, 1930–1970, at 45 (1982).
42. J. Craig Jenkins & Craig M. Eckert, Channeling Black Insurgency: Elite Patronage
and Professional Social Movement Organizations in the Development of the Black
Movement, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 812, 827 (1986).
43. See id.
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overdetermined critiques by pointing to discrepancies between lawyer
actions and the contested interests of their constituencies. Comparative
institutional analysis enables a relative evaluation of different models of
constituent representation, which interact and compete in the messy real
world of social movement conflict, while revealing how nonlegal
movement representatives confront analogous accountability problems as
they mobilize dissent outside of law.
2. Elites
From a comparative institutional perspective, evaluating lawyer
accountability to movements requires appraisal of alternative structures of
representation and how well they advance constituent interests. Challenges
to the adequacy of representation in social movements are often couched in
terms of political arguments wielded by one faction of a movement against
another. For example, Tomiko Brown-Nagin’s history of civil rights efforts
in Atlanta after Brown reveals conflict between the NAACP as an older,
more elitist, and incrementalist political organization and the Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) as a younger, more radical,
and more politically confrontational group.44 This conflict played out in
terms of lawyering style with NAACP lawyers like A.T. Walden committed
to “biracial negotiation and piecemeal civil rights litigation,”45 while
lawyers for SNCC, particularly Lou Holt, engaged in a “crusade to marry
litigation and direct action.”46 But the conflict went beyond models of
lawyering, as each group represented different constituencies (the
established black elite versus students) and adopted different approaches to
political mobilization (negotiation versus protest), reflecting distinctive
social change visions that lawyers were enlisted to advance.
The complex nature of accountability in social movements and the
challenge of evaluating lawyer interventions is highlighted in Guinier and
Torres’s important work on demosprudence, in which they posit an
affirmative role for lawyers in collaborating with movements to promote
sustained democratic change.47 In a key example, Guinier and Torres focus
on the role of lawyers in relation to the Mississippi Freedom Democratic
Party (MFDP).48 The MFDP, led by grassroots leaders including famed
activist Fannie Lou Hamer, sought to be seated at the 1964 Democratic
National Convention as the “official Mississippi delegates,” in place of the
all-white Democratic Party delegation, which had excluded blacks from the
franchise.49 In Guinier and Torres’s story, the northern elite white lawyer,
Joe Rauh, who represented the MFDP, is portrayed in unfavorable terms as
44. TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT:
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 195 (2011).

ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF

45. Id. at 199.
46. Id. at 194.
47. See Guinier & Torres, supra note 20, at 2743 (“The role played by legal
professionals . . . is essential.”).
48. Id. at 2762.
49. Id.
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a legal liberal insider whose quest for a pragmatic resolution to the highstakes standoff at the convention—a “behind the scenes” compromise in
which the MFDP would take two seats at the convention rather than its
sought-after full delegation status—undercut the radical potential of the
MFDP’s position.50 Rauh, in this view, “did not grasp” the MFDP’s
fundamental goal, which was to “organize, to develop the power of the local
people to change their own circumstances,”51 and ultimately to promote
participation and secure “freedom,” not simply “a convention seat for two
‘representatives.’”52 And Rauh did not pursue the appropriate means to
achieve this goal, failing to appreciate that the MFDP’s “challenge to state
power came from outside the precincts of normal politics,” instead
channeling that challenge into “conventional deal-making.”53
What seems clear from Guinier and Torres’s account is that Rauh had
multiple conflicts of interests in representing the MFDP: he was a delegate
from D.C. and “beholden to national unions” as legal counsel to the
powerful United Auto Workers, whose president, Walter Reuther, was part
of the team attempting to negotiate a compromise (along with leaders from
the Johnson administration and the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference, represented by Martin Luther King Jr.).54 However, it is not
clear how much Rauh mishandled his charge, which was to gain the MFDP
“shared seats with the regulars,”55 or what precisely turned on his
representational conflicts as opposed to the conflicts among the civil rights
movement leadership convened to find a solution to the MFDP challenge.
The MFDP was not “the movement” but rather an important organizational
component of it, which had retained Rauh precisely because his insider
status gave him credibility in the convention process.56 In that process,
movement leaders, including King, were already trying to negotiate a
solution.
With President Johnson intent on holding the Southern
Democratic Party together in the face of threatened defections if the MFDP
was seated in full, compromise appeared inevitable.57
In Guinier and Torres’s story, Rauh sought to negotiate a legalistic
solution, rather than appreciating that the goal of representation “was not
the same as ‘freedom.’”58 But it is not clear that the ultimate problem was
legal representational conflict as opposed to intramovement political
conflict. Rauh’s participation in the negotiations on its own seemed
appropriate, even essential, to representing his client’s interests. Perhaps it
was true that Rauh failed to bargain hard enough, did not adequately
express the degree to which the MFDP viewed the fight as having “a right

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 2769–70.
Id. at 2771–72.
Id. at 2772.
Id. at 2770.
Id. at 2769–71.
Id. at 2769.
Id. at 2770.
Id. at 2769.
Id. at 2772.
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side and a wrong side,”59 or expressed support for a two seat compromise
he knew would be unacceptable to his client. However, those failures have
to be weighed against what was possible and how Rauh understood his
duty.
In this regard, it seems arguable from the account that Rauh did his best
in the face of a classic organizational conflict: Who spoke for the MFDP?
Its leadership, which seemed to support the compromise? The majority?
Or the subgroup led by Fannie Lou Hamer? If it was the executive officers,
then Rauh’s belief that “he could not vote for the proposal, nor could he
endorse the compromise within the party chiefs, without the approval and
support of” the officers seems like a plausible representational position,
consistent with organizational ethical rules.60 From this point of view,
Guinier and Torres’s critique that Rauh “did not have the consent of the
entire MFDP delegation” is apt but not decisive.61 Moreover, the MFDP
ultimately rejected the compromise and walked away from the
convention,62 a position the group would have likely ended up with even if
Rauh had not played a brokering role given the background political
maneuvering to push compromise.
Folded into the story of Rauh’s lawyering, the MFDP example draws
attention to the critical role of elites in social movement governance and
how they affect the legitimacy of representation. A central premise of
movement lawyering is that following the dictates of movement leadership
renders legal representation more accountable to nonelites than the
conventional civil rights model, in which lawyers’ pursuit of elite interests
was viewed as undermining the goals of constituent members, as Bell’s
critique of the NAACP LDF underscored.63 Guinier and Torres make a
similar claim by distinguishing authentic movement organizations from
“interest groups,” viewed as part of conventional politics and therefore less
responsive to nonelite constituencies.64 However, it may be practically
difficult to distinguish movement organizations from interest groups in
ways that give lawyers clear guidance about authenticity. Although an
orientation toward institutionalized politics and ties to external funding may
be general characteristics of interest groups,65 the line between such groups
and SMOs is often too blurry to serve as a general proxy for distinguishing
elite and nonelite representation.
Ultimately, in charged debates among movement organizational leaders,
schisms are unavoidable and tend to occur along mainstream/radical and
elite/nonelite lines. Lawyers make representational choices in the context
of these splits and, as William Eskridge has pointed out, may generally be
inclined toward mainstream and elite positions by virtue of their training
59. Id. at 2770.
60. Id. at 2771.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Bell, Jr., supra note 4, at 503–05.
64. See Guinier & Torres, supra note 20, at 2757.
65. See Jack Walker, The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America, 77
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 390, 403–04 (1983).
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and status.66 However, it is important to underscore that the problem of
elite influence is not a problem of lawyering per se but rather a problem of
political representation embedded in social movements that then shapes
lawyer choices about client selection and tactics.
In the MFDP example, the failure of elite leadership seemed as important
as the failure of legal representation in thwarting the MFDP’s bid to be
seated at the convention. Indeed, Guinier and Torres’s insight that “[t]he
dominance of elite thought reveals a tension in the ways even the most
sympathetic elites ‘represent’ non-elites at the moment of action” seems
like the most central point.67 This tension is revealed in the exchange
between the MFDP delegates and Martin Luther King Jr., in which King
stated: “So, being a Negro leader, I want you to take this [compromise], but
if I were a Mississippi Negro, I would vote against it.”68 As this suggests,
King was in a similar representational position to Rauh.69 With both the
lawyer Rauh and the nonlawyer King, it was the eliteness of their political
position and their willingness to accept compromise that ultimately shape
Guinier and Torres’s assessment. “By attempting to serve two masters,
King sought to preserve his own status as an individual power broker,” in
contrast to Fannie Lou Hamer who tried “to hold [power-holders]
accountable to a larger vision of justice.”70 This suggests that the
fundamental accountability problem was not one of legal representation per
se but elite representation more broadly.71 In the end, it was the refusal of
elites to support the MFDP’s most ambitious goals that contributed to their
failure.
Critics of lawyer accountability are right to point out the ways in which
lawyer conflicts affect group representation, but they less frequently
compare lawyer conflicts to those faced by nonlawyer movement leaders.
Yet, as the MFDP example illustrates, nonlawyer leaders must navigate
their own conflicts among various movement interests.72 Although it is fair
to presume that grassroots movement leadership structures, run by members
of the affected constituencies, will generally be more accountable than
lawyers (especially when the lawyers are outsiders), that presumption might
not hold in all cases and would need to be tested on its own terms in
specific contexts. Along these lines, scholars like Tushnet have argued that
NAACP lawyers, at least in the early phase of the desegregation campaign,
helped to create well-developed accountability structures and were

66. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 13, at 466–67 (arguing that once lawyers get involved in a
social movement, the movement “has tended toward assimilationist and reformist rather than
separatist and radical stances, because lawyers cannot defend the latter before judges and
legislators who are their audience”).
67. Guinier & Torres, supra note 20, at 2773.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2774.
71. Id.
72. See TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN’S EDGE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1965–68,
at 129 (2006) (discussing leadership tensions between the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee).
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answerable to other movement stakeholders.73 In contrast, accounts of
grassroots heroes, such as Cesar Chavez, portray examples of
authoritarianism and peremptory decision making at odds with the
principles of participatory democracy they espoused.74
B. Relative Efficacy: As Opposed to What?
The question of whether law is an effective means to produce social
change has focused primarily on the value of litigation and court-centered
reform in contemporary social movements. Although much of the
scholarship has concentrated on the evaluation of court decisions
themselves, legal efficacy also shines the spotlight on the decision making
of lawyers in relation to the question of whether to pursue legal change
through court.75 Specifically, empirical claims about the weak enforcement
powers of courts have supported the critical argument that lawyer
investment in achieving policy-shifting court decisions may constitute a
misallocation of movement resources.76 Similarly, empirical claims that
aggressive court decisions changing policy may push society too fast too
soon have been used to suggest that lawyers defer litigation until society is
ready in order to avoid backlash.77 These claims form an interlocking
critical analysis in which court action is disfavored for either achieving too
little (weak enforcement) or too much (backlash). Implicit in this critical
analysis is the notion that better routes to reform exist through social
movement mobilization in politics and legislative policy change, which
would leverage stronger tools at the legislature’s disposal to produce better
implementation on the ground and avoid backlash by achieving greater
cultural acceptance.
It is this counterfactual that requires deeper
interrogation.
This section explores the idea of relative efficacy through analysis of two
seminal scholarly positions on court-based reform: Gerald Rosenberg’s
famous empirical analysis of the Supreme Court as a “hollow hope” for
progressive reformers, particularly his analysis of the failure of Brown to
produce meaningful desegregation in the South, and Michael Klarman’s
“backlash thesis,” which he applied to Brown and then extended to the preObergefell marriage equality movement. Again, in each case, the goal is
not to prove either argument wrong on their own terms but rather to surface
and engage with the implicit counterfactual embedded in each analysis:
that there were viable and more effective nonlegal routes to the
achievement of movement goals. The aim is to shift the frame of critical
73. See TUSHNET, supra note 38, at 157; see also MCADAM, supra note 41, at 132–33
(noting that local NAACP officials, along with clergy and students, held key leadership
positions in the nascent movement).
74. FRANK BARDACKE, TRAMPLING OUT THE VINTAGE 538–39 (2011) (describing
Chavez’s decision to purge suspected “leftist” leaders of the United Farm Workers’ boycotts
in 1976).
75. See, e.g., Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster: Looking for Change in All the
Wrong Places, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 795, 818 (2006).
76. See Lobel, supra note 18, at 949–50.
77. See, e.g., MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR 167–68 (2013).

2017]

LAWYERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

2001

analysis away from the specific limits of court-centered reform toward the
more generalized social movement challenges of policy implementation
(not just court enforcement) in the face of local resistance and of
countermobilization (not just backlash) in the face of social movement
success.
1. Implementation
A major concern about legal reform strategies is that they rely on an
institution—the courts—with weak enforcement powers and, as a result,
end up overinvesting in efforts that are unlikely to produce good results.
This criticism builds on the legacy of court impact studies in political
science and rests on a premise of institutional specialization: because
courts announce but do not enforce law, they are ill positioned to be agents
of social change.78 The comparative institutional perspective presented
here spotlights the fact that all decisions requiring affirmative governmental
action—whether issued by courts, promulgated by agencies, or enacted by
legislatures—have the potential for noncompliance and thus all raise the
possibility of a gap between law on the books and law in action. The
voluminous social science literature on implementation makes precisely this
point,79 which is directly relevant to the ex ante strategic question of
whether legal change should be pursued through court or other institutions.
In general, scholars have treated the impact of court decisions on social
reform in isolation from consideration of how such decisions fare relative to
viable alternatives.80 Critics of reform litigation might be able to prove the
absence of a correlation between a court decision and an implemented rule,
but that gap is politically significant to the extent that the decision to pursue
legal change through the court displaced a nonlegal strategy that was more
efficacious. Put differently, if political mobilization also might result in a
gap between a legislative rule and its implementation, the strategic decision
of whether to pursue law or politics requires a relative assessment of
enforcement alternatives. From this wider perspective, court enforcement is
seen as part of the more general problem of policy implementation.
Comparative institutional analysis provides a way to assess this general
problem by drawing attention to empirical evidence of implementation
challenges outside of courts and also making connections to stories of
movement decline after legislative, rather than judicial, victories.
The lack of comparative institutional analysis of the enforcement
problem reflects underlying disciplinary fault lines. Legal scholars
interested in enforcement have gravitated toward political science studies of
78. See ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 15.
79. See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A
BILL BECOMES A LAW (1978); ROBERT T. NAKAMURA & FRANK SMALLWOOD, THE POLITICS
OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION (1980); JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON B. WILDAVSKY,
IMPLEMENTATION: HOW GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND
(1973).
80. See, e.g., Stephen L. Wasby, The United States Supreme Court’s Impact:
Broadening Our Focus, 49 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1023, 1024–25 (1974).

2002

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

courts, which have developed along a separate track than research on policy
implementation. Political scientists in the two decades after Brown
produced an impressive body of “court impact” studies, the central result of
which was to repeatedly show that court decisions generally, and Supreme
Court decisions in particular, failed to translate into robust social change on
the ground.81 In this line of research, scholars found that desegregation
plans often resulted in little actual desegregation,82 court decisions barring
mandatory religious instruction were widely disregarded,83 and the Warren
Court’s revolution in criminal procedure produced laws to protect suspect
rights that received only partial respect from law enforcement officials.84
Although these and other studies used various methodologies,85 they were
united in the general conclusion that law on the books systemically
diverged from the law in action—revealing the “banality of
noncompliance.”86
Coming out of the court impact tradition, Gerald Rosenberg, in his
influential book The Hollow Hope, offered what would be the apotheosis of
court impact studies of the civil rights era.87 The project was impressive in
its scope and ambition, which was to determine “whether, and under what
conditions, courts produce significant social reform.”88 To do so,
Rosenberg went beyond scholars before him in two ways. First, he
developed a sophisticated theoretical model of the “Constrained Court,”
which presumed that “courts will generally not be effective producers of
significant social reform for three reasons: the limited nature of
constitutional rights, the lack of judicial independence, and the judiciary’s
inability to develop appropriate policies and its lack of powers of
implementation.”89 Second, Rosenberg amassed a formidable amount of
empirical data to investigate the relationship between court decisions and
social change across the iconic issue areas of legal liberalism: civil rights

81. See Jon B. Gould & Scott Barclay, Mind the Gap: The Place of Gap Studies in
Sociolegal Scholarship, 8 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 323, 324–25 (2012) (noting that court
impact studies “had their heyday in the late 1960s and early 1970s”).
82. See Comparative Analysis of the Eight Cities, 2 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 89, 96 (1967)
(“Even in cities with the most ardently committed boards which had adopted seemingly
comprehensive plans for integration, there was much less change than one would have
suspected.”).
83. Robert H. Birkby, The Supreme Court and the Bible Belt: Tennessee Reaction to the
Schempp Decision, 10 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 304, 308 (1966) (studying the reaction of
Tennessee school districts to the Court’s decision in Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963), showing that despite the decision, 70 of 121 school districts continued
Bible readings in class).
84. See Michael Wald et al., Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76
YALE L.J. 1519, 1613 (1967) (finding that “[n]ot much has changed after Miranda” in terms
of how police conduct interrogations).
85. James P. Levine, Methodological Concerns in Studying Supreme Court Efficacy, 4
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 583, 584 (1970).
86. See KENNETH M. DOLBEARE & PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER
DECISIONS: FROM COURT POLICY TO LOCAL PRACTICE 151 (1971).
87. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 5.
88. Id. at 9.
89. Id. at 10.
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(particularly Brown)90 and women’s rights (particularly Roe),91 as well as
the environment,92 voting,93 and criminal procedure.94 On the basis of this
sweeping analysis, he offered his famous conclusion: “U.S. courts can
almost never be effective producers of significant social reform.”95
Rosenberg’s controversial analysis of Brown, concluding that the
decision produced no meaningful desegregation and instead of generating
public support provoked political backlash, received the most attention.96
With respect to the direct effect of Brown on segregation, measured by the
percentage of black children enrolled with whites in the South, Rosenberg
argued that the opinion itself produced no meaningful change in the decade
after Brown. In addition, he argued that it was only with the arrival of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, which threatened to cut off federal funding for
segregated schools, that there was significant desegregation.97 The lesson
was that while legislation worked to produce integration, the judicial
decision did not.
However, while it was true that more rapid desegregation occurred after
1964, there are confounding variables and later countertrends that cloud the
picture. First, the Court explicitly delayed enforcement in its famous
remedial order counseling “all deliberate speed.”98 It was not until the
Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Green v. School Board of New Kent
County99 that it fully committed itself to wiping out segregation “root and
branch.”100 A study by the UCLA Civil Rights Project found that legal
enforcement affected the rate and scope of desegregation, which peaked in
1988 due in part to focused resources devoted by the federal Department of
Justice to enforcement efforts; decline occurred as a result of “a strong legal
attack on desegregation orders, led by the Reagan and Bush
administrations’ Justice Departments and, in 1991, the Supreme Court
authorized the termination of desegregation plans.”101 Second, over time,
despite short-term improvement, residential resegregation and legal failures
to extend the scope of desegregation orders beyond jurisdictional
boundaries caused school segregation to revert to the same level it was in

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 42.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 292.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 70–71.
Id. at 74–75.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1954).
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
Id. at 438.
GARY ORFIELD & ERICA FRANKENBERG, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, BROWN AT 60:
GREAT PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 10 (2014), https://
www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/brown-at60-great-progress-a-long-retreat-and-an-uncertain-future/Brown-at-60-051814.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8JNA-F4GR].
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1968,102 complicating Rosenberg’s claim that legislative reform was an
essential spark to desegregation.
Rosenberg also denied any substantial indirect effect of Brown on public
opinion or movement activism. He argued that although there was
substantial elite support for desegregation prior to the Court’s 1954
decision, the decision itself caused a retrogression of public support,
especially among southern whites.103 However, in terms of the effect of
Brown on the mobilization of movement actors, the evidence is mixed.
Although Rosenberg suggests Brown did not contribute to mobilization,
other scholars have noted the power of Brown in making segregation appear
vulnerable, referencing King’s famous speech on the eve of the
Montgomery bus boycott.104 In this regard, activist Bayard Rustin spoke
directly to the relationship between Brown and the movement’s success:
What made ’54 so unusual was that the Supreme Court in the Brown
decision established black people as being citizens with all the rights of
all other citizens. Once that happened, then it was very easy for that
militancy, which had been building up, to express itself in the
Montgomery bus boycott of ’55–’56.105

From a comparative institutional perspective, the question of how court
decisions affect social change may be usefully reframed in comparison with
parallel discussions within political science on the implementation of
legislative statutes and administrative rules—i.e., policy enacted through
the political branches and not the courts. Echoing the research on court
impact, an important early study noted that implementation depended on the
qualities of the regulation (clarity and sanctions), regulators (degree of
executive commitment and resources), and regulatees (cohesiveness,
leadership, and levels of defiance).106 Looking at these factors, researchers
concluded that policy reform produced mixed results in different contexts.
Roger Hanson and Robert Crew found that reapportionment did not
produce significant changes in state spending in central cities,107 while two
separate studies found that federal employment policies were not
implemented in Oakland, leading Eugene Bardach to issue this harsh
indictment: “[A]fter a policy mandate is agreed to, authorized, and adopted,
there is underachievement of stated objectives, . . . delay, and excessive
financial cost.”108 Joel Handler, in his pathbreaking work on welfare
policy, emphasized how frontline administrative discretion of welfare
102. Id.
103. ROSENBERG, supra note 5, at 75.
104. Christopher Coleman, Laurence D. Nee & Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Social
Movements and Social-Change Litigation: Synergy in the Montgomery Bus Protest, 30 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 663, 674 (2005).
105. VOICES OF FREEDOM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM THE
1950S THROUGH THE 1980S, at xxvii (Henry Hampton & Steve Faye eds., 1990).
106. FREDERICK M. WIRT, POLITICS OF SOUTHERN EQUALITY: LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN A MISSISSIPPI COUNTY 282–83 (1970).
107. Roger A. Hanson & Robert E. Crew, Jr., The Policy Impact of Reapportionment, 8
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 69, 89 (1973).
108. BARDACH, supra note 79, at 3.
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officers made policy implementation diverge from the intent of helping the
poor.109 Overall, implementation research found that, although the political
branches potentially had more levers to pressure compliance on the ground,
such as the withdrawal of local funding, they nonetheless faced significant
barriers to implementation in the face of local officials with decisionmaking discretion.
In addition to highlighting parallel enforcement programs across different
lawmaking domains, a comparative institutional perspective also helps to
reframe the broader critique of court-centered reform as co-opting and
demobilizing social movements. Again, the comparative institutional move
is not to deny that this can occur but to point out how parallel co-optation
and demobilization dynamics may happen in the wake of legislative
success. In this regard, the labor movement offers a counterstory of
legislative victory followed by movement decline that is given less attention
in critiques of legal liberalism. In William Forbath’s historical account, it
was precisely organized labor’s distrust of courts, sewed by judicial
nullification of labor-backed redistributive policy and interference with
collective action though antistrike injunctions, that shaped the labor
movement’s voluntarist approach to government regulation.110 The
movement first sought to protect the right to strike against judicial
interference and then to protect labor’s freedom to collectively bargain
through statutory codification and administrative enforcement.111 Yet the
pathway of legislative reform, designed to disentangle organized labor from
the courts, did not succeed over the long term in sustaining the movement,
which has seen union density rates in the private sector fall dramatically—
undermined by a combination of corporate resistance, legal revision, and
administrative co-optation.112
2. Backlash
The critique of legal efficacy relates not only to the degree to which court
decisions fail to work on the ground but also to how they may impose harm
on social movements. This concern is most prominent in discussions of
backlash, which has become an important framework for assessing policyshifting court action.113

109. See Joel F. Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 479, 484–85 (1966).
110. WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT
16 (1991).
111. Id. at 163–65 (discussing passage of the Norris LaGuardia and Wagner Acts).
112. See generally Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002).
113. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, Empirical Studies of Law and Social Change, 2013
WIS. L. REV. 171, 203 (discussing the Obama administration’s decision not to assert the
broad constitutional right to marry in the Supreme Court litigation over California’s
Proposition 8, barring same-sex marriage).
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Backlash is a concept with a long history,114 which achieved prominence
in law with historian Michael Klarman’s analysis of Brown,115 followed by
political scientist Gerald Rosenberg’s analysis of same-sex marriage
litigation.116 The concept of backlash builds upon the political science
literature on the relation between judicial decision making and public
opinion.117 The basic question underlying backlash is whether rule change
produces culture change or vice versa.
This question has direct
implications for strategic advocacy decisions by lawyers. If court decisions
reflect but do not produce norm change, that counsels in favor of the tactical
decision to build up support on the ground before turning to the court. If
court decisions do move public opinion, then lawyers may be wise to go to
court before investing deeply in political mobilization. In the real world,
the prospective impact of court decisions is inherently uncertain and
lawyers considering litigation to achieve policy reform must make complex
judgments about how their judicial success might shape public attitudes
about their cause—for better or for worse. The comparative institutional
perspective developed here adds an another strategic layer, which is that, in
weighing the decision to litigate, advocates must also make predictions
about the potential of nonlegal strategies to affect public opinion and
produce backlash.
The backlash thesis states that when a court decision is strongly out of
line with a majority of the public’s view of an issue, the majority will resort
to politics to counteract that court decision.118 The intensity of the backlash
depends in part on the degree of variance between public opinion and the
court’s opinion: the greater the public opposition, the more vigorous the
backlash.119 Lawyers assessing the prospective decision to litigate for
policy change must therefore ask themselves whether public opposition to
their position is so strong that winning in court risks mobilizing opposition
in ways that could impair or even negate their victory. The comparative
institutional framework suggests, in addition, that lawyers must judge the
costs of this potential judicial backlash relative to the anticipated costs of
other routes of social movement action, including the costs of doing
nothing.
114. See Rita Bruun, The Boldt Decision: Legal Victory, Political Defeat, 4 LAW &
POL’Y Q. 271, 286 (1982).
115. See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); Michael J. Klarman,
supra note 5.
116. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 355–419 (2nd ed. 2008).
117. See, e.g., William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal
Model, and Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. POL. 169,
197 (1996).
118. KLARMAN, supra note 77, at 169 (“Political backlash results from government action
that strongly contravenes public opinion.”).
119. Id. at 168 (noting how court decisions in favor of same-sex marriage “generated
enormous political backlash because they endorsed gay marriage at a time when public
opinion, which had been growing more progressive on other gay rights issues, remained
strongly opposed to it”).
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A comparative framework is meant to spotlight a critical but widely
overlooked point in the backlash literature, which is that the concept of
judicial backlash implies that a nonjudicial path to a movement’s goal
exists that would not produce backlash at all, or would produce backlash at
a lower level of intensity. Although it is impossible to ever prove or
disprove this counterfactual, it is helpful to make it explicit in order to
better judge the risks and rewards involved when lawyers have to make the
strategic choice of whether to pursue impact litigation.
This comparative analysis asks, in part, what the potential is for backlash
to occur through legislative policy reform. In this regard, there is some
debate within the literature about the mechanics of backlash: in particular,
whether backlash is more likely to occur when a court makes a
controversial decision of social policy instead of a legislature.120 The issue
is whether backlash is related to what the public views as the relative
institutional competence of courts and legislatures in making controversial
social policy decisions, so that if a court makes such a decision, the
backlash independently responds to the fact that it was a court decision,
rather than the decision itself.121 William Eskridge suggests this in his
analysis of Roe v. Wade,122 where he argues that the Court short-circuited
politics and “declared a winner” on a divisive social issue.123 In his
discussion of the movement for abortion rights, Gordon Silverstein makes a
similar claim about the institutionally specific risks of court reform:
“Unlike a political strategy in which it would have been necessary to
change public opinion before embedding these protections in law, a judicial
strategy allowed policy change without necessarily changing minds.”124
Thus, “changes in judicial appointments could (and have) put these policy
accomplishments at great risk.”125
Klarman, in his most recent work on same-sex marriage, states that
whether government action “derives from legislatures or courts seems
relatively unimportant” in producing backlash.126 Supporting this view, a
recent experimental study showed that whether a controversial legal change
at odds with public opinion occurs via courts or legislatures does not
significantly affect average attitudes about the underlying issues, although
court decisions increase the intensity with which those attitudes are held.127
The comparative institutional perspective focuses on how the judicial
backlash thesis depends on the possibility of extralegal social movement
alternatives to court action and suggests how directly engaging that
120. See generally David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just
Backlash?: Evidence from a National Experiment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 731 (2012)
(summarizing this debate).
121. See id. at 739–40.
122. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
123. William N. Eskridge, Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy
by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1312 (2005).
124. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 7, at 271.
125. Id.
126. KLARMAN, supra note 77, at 169.
127. Fontana & Braman, supra note 120, at 763–64.
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possibility may reframe how we assess lawyers’ tactical choices. Doing so
requires adopting the lawyer’s perspective at the moment of decision
making in order to evaluate how the backlash calculus affects whether or
when to turn to courts as a social change tool.
Klarman’s view of backlash rests on the following observations. The
first is that court decisions may raise the public salience of issues in ways
that force people and politicians to take a position that they may not have
had to confront, often provoking a more negative reaction.128 Second,
although there may be no difference in public reaction when courts or
legislatures decide on issues at the same distance from public opinion,
courts are more likely to make decisions at a larger variance and thus are
more likely to be in the position of provoking backlash.129 Third, the
intensity of the backlash is related to the intensity of support for and against
the issue: if decision opponents are more mobilized than supporters, the
backlash will be worse.130 Both the second and third points relate to the
nature and extent of the backlash that ensues. When more people feel more
strongly about the incorrectness of a court decision, they will go further to
reverse it through political channels. This is related to a fourth point, that
controversial decisions provide vehicles for political parties to mobilize
their constituents for overall political advantage.131
Another set of backlash arguments relates not to the impact on decision
opponents but on decision supporters. Here, the idea is that controversial
decisions that have a high public profile may reset a movement’s agenda in
a way that diverts resources away from other important issues that may
have otherwise had political traction. In the marriage context, Klarman’s
argument (before the events leading to Obergefell v. Hodges132) was that
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health133 moved the focus away from
hate crime and antidiscrimination legislative advocacy in conservative
states, and the momentum for more politically popular civil unions
receded.134 A related argument is that controversial opinions undercut the
ability of a movement’s political supporters to capitalize on opponents’
extreme positions on other issues. Thus, if Democrats wanted to score
political points because of the Republican Party’s extreme views opposing
antidiscrimination laws for gays and lesbians, that became harder when the
political focus shifted to marriage, an issue about which there was more
political consensus across party lines.135
One implication of the backlash analysis is that if there is a wide
discrepancy between public opinion and what would be asked from a court,
then lawyers should think hard about whether to proceed with the court
challenge. The difficult question is how to conduct that evaluation in a way
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

KLARMAN, supra note 77, at 165–66.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 183.
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
KLARMAN, supra note 77, at 179.
Id. at 180.
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that fully considers the range of risks and rewards. First, two obvious but
important, observations are in order about lawyer decision making. One is
that there is a threshold calculation about whether a legal challenge will be
successful on the merits. Movement lawyers must have a degree of
confidence, which is never 100 percent, that they have the precedent,
arguments, and enough judicial allies to carry the legal day. This is
inherently uncertain, but one can make predictions based on past decisionmaking records. The point is that this is a separate calculation from the
backlash one, which goes to the problems that may arise after achieving
legal success.
This leads to a second observation, which relates to how lawyers might
think about the costs of winning. In almost any situation in which a
minority group deprived of rights seeks their validation through court, the
minority does so in contravention of public opinion. This means that the
strategic choice for lawyers is either one of continued deprivation of the
right or the pursuit of reform through court with backlash (because backlash
is defined as a majority political response to a minority-advancing judicial
decision). In other words, one would expect that a dominant and hostile
majority would respond to a court decision upholding minority rights by
using the political machinery that the majority, by definition, already
controls to reverse it. And, indeed, we know from the historical record,
dating back to Brown, that movement lawyers consider this possibility
when they decide whether to proceed to court by asking: Is the expected
cost of backlash greater than the expected benefit of court victory, measured
against the baseline of the continued deprivation of the right?
From a lawyering perspective, this calculation can be broken down into
related sets of questions. First, what is the cost of maintaining the status
quo of a continued rights violation? One aspect of this question relates to
how long the deprivation might last in the absence of legal challenge. That
is, if socioeconomic conditions and demographic trends are changing
rapidly such that public attitudes are moving toward support for the
minority position, movement lawyers might decide to wait given the
potential downsides of legal action and the deeper change they might
achieve through a legislative strategy built on growing public support. This
is one of the arguments against Roe: that choice supporters were making
progress at the state level and had this been left to play out, a more stable
equilibrium could have been achieved.136 A state-by-state approach,
however, raises a second dimension of the problem, which is the potential
for geographic variation. Although it may be true that a state-by-state
approach embeds victories in politically sympathetic states and may not
mobilize opposition in hostile states, the rights deprivation remains in those
hostile states. That is in fact what happened with respect to same-sex
marriage before Obergefell.137 Thus, part of the legal equation is whether
136. For an analysis of this argument, see Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before
(and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028 (2011).
137. See Robert Barnes & Fred Barbash, Supreme Court Hears Arguments in Historic
Gay-Marriage Case, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
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substantial rights deprivation is tolerable, and for how long, and what the
appropriate tipping point is at which the Court might weigh in favor of the
right to “suppress outliers.”138 This is an extremely difficult question but
one that will always inform a movement lawyer’s choice.
Even if continued rights deprivation would be intolerable, that does not
answer the question of whether to assert a legal challenge, because success
could reinforce the status quo or make conditions worse. Thus, a second
question is whether backlash makes the challenger group worse off than it
otherwise would have been without litigation. That was Rosenberg’s
position on marriage prior to the campaign that culminated in Obergefell:
that because Baehr v. Lewin139 and Goodridge sparked constitutional
amendments in twenty-seven states and statutory amendments in others, it
set the movement back below the starting point by making it harder to
achieve the goal of marriage.140 How should lawyers think about the risk
that social reform litigation “may set their cause back”?141
First, and more narrowly, it would not seem like the passage of a statute
in a state where there is de facto denial of a right is a significant setback
because the right would have to be asserted via legislative process or court
opinion in any event. What about the constitutional amendments? These
were in states where the opposition to marriage was so deep that it seems
implausible that the politics would have changed within a reasonable time
frame. In such a context, how harmful a state constitutional amendment is
to the ultimate realization of a movement goal is partly a function of how
difficult the amendment would be to rescind. Some states, for example,
permit constitutional amendments via majority vote on ballot initiatives. In
those states, the achievement of majority public support for a movement’s
goal would permit the movement to reamend the constitution to codify that
goal. Although this would certainly involve significant investments of time
and money, it is not clear how much more costly it would be than codifying
the promovement goal in a deeply hostile state through alternative means.
A deeper problem for movement proponents is that moving too quickly
may not only cause a counterreaction in the form of new legal barriers to
goal achievement, it may also move further away from the goal by causing
public support to deteriorate. A court decision resulting in a constitutional
amendment foreclosing the right is bad for movement proponents on its
own terms. It is worse if it also causes more people to be opposed to the
right since that would make it harder to reverse the legal damage done by
the amendment itself. So if the ultimate pathway to reform is through
shifting culture, then that goal moves further away. However, it is difficult
to predict in advance if a legal decision will have a negative or positive
politics/courts_law/supreme-court-will-hear-historic-arguments-in-gay-marriage-cases/2015/
04/27/083d9302-ed24-11e4-8666-a1d756d0218e_story.html?utm_term=.a1f2396f2e2d
[https://perma.cc/93GA-8YP8].
138. Justin Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929, 961 (2014).
139. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
140. ROSENBERG, supra note 116, at 416.
141. Id. at 419.
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effect on public opinion. For instance, in California, there was no evidence
that opposition to marriage increased because of the California Supreme
Court’s assertion of a constitutional right to marry in 2008.142 Or consider
Loving v. Virginia,143 which was followed by a decrease in public support
for antimiscegenation laws although opposition to interracial marriage was
as high in the mid-1960s as opposition to same-sex marriage was in the
early 1990s before the Baehr decision in Hawaii.144
Two further points are in order. From an ex ante perspective, even if one
accepted that there were costs of pursuing legal redress through courts and
that the movement could end up in a worse position by doing so, that would
not end the analysis. For one, there is the uncertainty point. One would
want to calculate the probability that certain harms would occur. In the
event that there was a significant possibility that they would not, a court
challenge might be worth pursuing given the intolerable nature of the status
quo.
The comparative institutional point is that even if one was confident of
negative consequences flowing from a court strategy, those consequences
would have to be compared against the consequences of viable movement
alternatives. As already suggested, there is always the alternative of
waiting, but for those in the movement who either suffer or identify with
the harm, the cost of waiting is likely to be intolerably high.
The backlash thesis does not typically presume that the alternative to
court action is doing nothing. Rather, the argument is that a political
strategy is available and would be more effective at building public support
over time in ways that bring about more sustainable change. However, here
too, the picture is more complicated precisely because court decisions are
not the only opportunities for political entrepreneurs to mobilize opposition.
As has been the case with President Obama’s legislative achievements, like
Obamacare, and executive action, like the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals program, nonlegal successes can also be used to stoke political
opposition.145 And even a state-by-state political approach may ultimately
build to the point that it becomes a wedge issue that might be used to
galvanize opposition. Linda Greenhouse and Reva Siegel’s analysis of the
history of Roe demonstrates this dynamic by showing how political
entrepreneurs within the Republican Party were already working with the
Catholic Church to mobilize religiously conservative voters against
142. See Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57
UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1321–24 (2010).
143. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
144. Karlyn Bowman, Interracial Marriage: Changing Laws, Minds and Hearts, FORBES
(Jan. 13, 2017, 10:43 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bowmanmarsico/2017/01/13/
interracial-marriage-changing-laws-minds-and-hearts/#153f6f597c59 (“In 1963, 59% of
whites favored laws against interracial marriage. In 1968, 53% did. By the summer of 1970,
a majority said such laws should not exist, and a majority has given that response ever
since.”) [https://perma.cc/Y3WE-AKHT].
145. Grace-Marie Turner, A Resistance Movement Rises Against ObamaCare,
FORBES (Dec. 10, 2012, 5:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gracemarieturner/2012/12/
10/a-resistance-movement-rises-against-obamacare/#54e1ad782c7d [https://perma.cc/5Q4ZUR2W].
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abortion as part of the party’s “Southern Strategy” before the Court’s
decision.146 Particularly in a post-Trump era in which hyperpartisanship
and the pervasiveness of media spin have made it easier to use information
to motivate political attacks, one can foresee legislative victories also
posing backlash risk. Whether the risk is greater or less than that incurred
by a decisive Supreme Court decision is again a complex and uncertain
question. The point here is to underscore that developing better theoretical
and empirical frameworks to answer the question is critically important to
charting prospective mobilization and judging its outcome.
In this regard, some scholars have recently sought to focus attention on
how strategic lawyer decision making intersects with the potential for
backlash. David Schraub’s analysis of when legal arguments or decisions
may produce “sticky slopes” that injure a movement is an important case in
point.147 In Schraub’s view, a sticky slope occurs when the achievement of
policy success A at time one acts to block further reform B at time two.148
This possibility has strategic implications, as “the specter of the sticky slope
may counsel opposing, delaying, or modifying the demand for A, on the
grounds that it will pose a later barrier to B.”149 One of Schraub’s examples
of a “simple” sticky slope is the Supreme Court’s decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut,150 which he suggests may have mobilized more people to
oppose “its extension to abortion rights in Roe v. Wade.”151 He also
identifies as a sticky slope a legal success that demobilizes a movement,
“dissipating its momentum and rendering it vulnerable to counterattack.”152
In his analysis of “wrong argument” sticky slopes, he traces how particular
legal frames, like “colorblindness,” which appear compelling at the time
they are presented (as in Brown), may later turn against the movement as
they feed too easily into arguments by movement opponents, as he suggests
was the case in the Court’s use of colorblindness to strike down a Seattle
school district’s voluntary desegregation plan in Parents Involved v. Seattle
School District No. 1.153 In Schraub’s terms, “Early reformist rhetoric and
argumentation often sets the tone for the entire course of the movement, and
if it is not chosen carefully a social movement can get stuck due to initial
missteps.”154 Moreover, arguments that push too hard, instead of nudging
norm change, can produce noncompliance or undermine confidence in law,
which can have a negative impact on long-term social movement goals.155
Although Schraub’s conception of sticky slopes is theoretically
compelling and empirically plausible, it raises problems that are also
146. Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 136, at 2083–85.
147. David Schraub, Sticky Slopes, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1249, 1249 (2013).
148. Id. at 1252.
149. Id.
150. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
151. Schraub, supra note 147, at 1263.
152. Id. at 1264.
153. 551 U.S. 701 (2007); see also Schraub, supra note 147, at 1278–79 (citing Parents
Involved, 551 U.S. 29).
154. Schraub, supra note 147, at 1290.
155. Id. at 1299–300.
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apparent in the backlash literature. First, although Schraub resists the
backlash frame and does extend his analysis to all types of movement
policy gains, his main focus is on the sticky slope potential of court
decisions. As discussed above, although court-induced stickiness is an
important strategic consideration for lawyers and activists contemplating a
court-centered reform strategy, it is only part of the analysis because one
must also contemplate the consequences of alternative strategies, as well as
of inaction, which itself may become “sticky” by suggesting acquiescence
to the status quo. As social movement theorists emphasize, any type of
political success can dampen movement mobilization,156 while issue
framing may tend toward more mainstream normative concepts in order to
have the broadest resonance,157 a move that also makes them particularly
susceptible to later revision. Finally, even if it is true that some types of
legal strategies and arguments may produce sticky slopes that have longterm movement costs, those costs must be weighed against the likelihood
that other strategies would have produced better results. The indeterminacy
of doctrine makes it hard to imagine how movement opponents bent on
undoing old gains could not find some rhetorical basis in original
movement arguments to do so. Would black students have been better off
in the long term if the Brown Court had mandated equalization, rather than
desegregation, as Bell has suggested?158 Would they be better off if the
Court had not weighed in at all and activists had sought local political
solutions instead?
Changes in the media have also affected the way advocates think about
court-based strategies in relation to backlash. It seems plausible that in the
1950s and 1960s, public opinion of the Supreme Court was such that many
people viewed it as a neutral body above politics. In this context, it may
have been the case that by overtly wading into politics in Brown and
subsequent high-profile cases on deeply contested issues of social policy,
the Court lost its veneer of neutrality in a way that provoked strongly
negative public reactions.
However, times have changed so that popular opinion of the Court may
hinge less on its neutrality. The structure of political contention is highly
developed, and media culture is profoundly different than it was at the time
of Brown, when the conduit of information transmission was through major
periodicals or the canonical nightly television news.159 Now, in contrast,
opinion is deeply influenced by a range of new media actors, vying for
156. See Devashree Gupta, The Power of Incremental Outcomes: How Small Victories
and Defeats Affect Social Movement Organizations, 14 MOBILIZATION 417, 418 (2009).
157. For a discussion of how collective action frames may enable or constrain social
movement mobilization, see David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Master Frames and
Cycles of Protest, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 133 (Aldon D. Morris &
Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992).
158. Derrick A. Bell, Bell, J., Dissenting, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK
CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 185, 187 (Jack Balkin ed., 2002).
159. Steven H. Chaffee & Miriam J. Metzger, The End of Mass Communication?, 4 MASS
COMM. & SOC’Y 365, 369–74 (2001).
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attention in the hyperpartisan and more decentralized 24/7 news cycle.160
This means it is no longer simply the case that the public will react to court
decisions based on a preexisting narrative frame about judicial competence
but that public reaction will be shaped by competing narratives crafted by
partisans and often disseminated through social media feeds that target a
selected audience. Proponents of court decisions will therefore need to get
their message out to combat negative messaging from the other side. How
this competition plays out is not completely certain; the only certainty is
that it will occur and that advocates must have a public relations plan to
complement their litigation plan. In assessing backlash threat in this new
environment, comparative institutional analysis must therefore assess a
broader range of factors related to opinion formation and change.
In the end, the risk of court-specific backlash analysis is that it may
present an incomplete cost-benefit calculation that shapes a negative
assessment of legal interventions in ways that have the effect of counseling
in favor of a politics of lawyer circumspection. In this critical vision, by
framing the issue as backlash, what may at bottom be dynamics that
systematically disadvantage challenges by less powerful social groups are
converted into justifications for blaming lawyers for the results of their
challenges. The frame of backlash suggests something wrong with the
strategic choice as opposed to the underlying opposition in the first
instance. Movements are thus in a double bind: locked into subordination
until enlightened views ultimately prevail or blamed for the hostility
engendered should they have the temerity to challenge the status quo.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to reframe the foundational critiques of lawyers
in social movements by holding up the mirror of critical scholarly
commentary on their nonlegal counterparts. The goal of this exercise has
been to spotlight important similarities in the problems scholars identify
across the domains of legal and nonlegal mobilization for social change.
Overall, comparative institutional analysis draws attention to how risks of
legal action may be overstated by the tendency to conflate negative
campaign outcomes resulting from political disadvantage with negative
campaign outcomes resulting from the use of legal strategies. Because it is
generally not possible to know whether a particular bad legal outcome is
worse than hypothetical alternatives (either waiting or advancing change
through nonlegal channels), scholars may misidentify weaknesses in social
movement politics as defects in reform-oriented lawyering. Similarly, the
rewards of movement-led change may be overstated because of a tendency
to extrapolate historical lessons from different epochs and political contexts
to the present era, in which progressive movements face distinct constraints.

160. See, e.g., Matthew A. Baum & Philip B.K. Potter, The Relationships Between Mass
Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis, 11 ANN. REV.
POL. SCI. 39, 52–53 (2008).

2017]

LAWYERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

2015

Reframing the foundational critiques of lawyers through the lens of this
comparative institutional perspective yields two important insights. First,
reframing suggests that scholarly discomfort with lawyer participation in
social movements may express less of a professional critique than a
political one, reflecting deeper concerns about the movement costs of elite
representation and the pursuit of institutional politics. From this vantage
point, accountability concerns are not intrinsically about the
representational problems of the lawyer-client relationship but rather about
the political tradeoffs of elite representation of different elements of
contested social movement constituencies. Efficacy is not just a debate
about litigation and courts but reflects political disagreements over the
utility of elite intermediation, incremental reform, and the legitimacy of
democratic institutions. Second, broadening the theoretical perspective to
encompass the challenges faced by nonlawyers in social movements may
rehabilitate the role of their lawyer counterparts—revealing lawyers as less
suspect allies in outsider challenges to power and pointing toward a more
optimistic account in which lawyers act as partners, and sometimes even
leaders, in struggles for transformative democratic change.

